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Abstract
Visual working memory provides an essential link between past and future events. Despite recent efforts, capacity limits,
their genesis and the underlying neural structures of visual working memory remain unclear. Here we show that
performance in visual working memory - but not iconic visual memory - can be predicted by the strength of mental imagery
as assessed with binocular rivalry in a given individual. In addition, for individuals with strong imagery, modulating the
background luminance diminished performance on visual working memory and imagery tasks, but not working memory for
number strings. This suggests that luminance signals were disrupting sensory-based imagery mechanisms and not a general
working memory system. Individuals with poor imagery still performed above chance in the visual working memory task,
but their performance was not affected by the background luminance, suggesting a dichotomy in strategies for visual
working memory: individuals with strong mental imagery rely on sensory-based imagery to support mnemonic
performance, while those with poor imagery rely on different strategies. These findings could help reconcile current
controversy regarding the mechanism and location of visual mnemonic storage.
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Introduction
The study of working memory has long been an area of interest
for researchers due to its ubiquity in daily life, its close links to
many high-level cognitive functions, psychopathologies [1] and the
large individual variability present in both performance and
capacity [2–4]. The storage mechanism and capacity limits of
visual working memory have been and remain controversial [2,5–
8]. Likewise, the neural correlates of visual working memory have
stirred up considerable debate, with some studies reporting
sustained activity in high-level neural structures [9–11] while
others, more recently, reporting early-level visual cortex [12,13].
Behavioural studies support the involvement of early visual cortex,
as they suggests that visual working memory can maintain visual
information at a resolution typically only observed in early visual
cortex [14–18].
There have been suggestions that visual working memory may
involve mental imagery [19,20], such propositions dovetail nicely
with the visual spatial sketchpad component of composite theories
of working memory [21,22]. Interestingly the neural correlates of
imagery have provoked a debate similar to the one in the visual
working memory literature. Some neuroimaging studies have
found no significant increase in neural activity in the early visual
areas during imagery tasks [23–28]. More recently however,
neuroimaging studies have found that early areas of the visual
cortex are activated during imagery tasks as well as later visual
areas [29–31]. Studies employing transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion over early visual cortex further show that disruption of visual
cortical activity can impair imagery tasks [32] and recent
behavioural work has provided strong evidence that visual imagery
is contingent on activity in early visual cortex [33,34]. Interference
style tasks also provide evidence that imagery may be involved in
maintaining visual information in memory with some studies
indicating that visual interference in the form of irrelevant pictures
and dynamic visual noise deteriorates performance on both visual
working memory and imagery tasks [20,35–40]. However other
work has failed to show these effects, with some studies finding no
effects of dynamic visual noise on either working memory and/or
imagery tasks [41–44].
Subjective reports of strategies employed during visual working
memory may also provide insight into the role of imagery during
visual working memory. Subjective reports from participants
performing visual working memory tasks sometimes suggest a
strategy that involves creating a detailed mental image to help
performance [13,45,46]. These reports suggest that some partic-
ipants may engage in the effortful generation of internal visual
representations of the remembered items. The participant’s
descriptions are synonymous with definitions of mental imagery,
potentially implicating imagery as a possible cognitive strategy
used to solve visual working memory tasks.
Since the time of Sir Francis Galton [47] it has been noted that
individuals differ in their self-reports of mental imagery ability.
Some people report that they experience very intense, vivid images
akin to actually seeing the item, whereas others report no ‘image’
per se, instead an individual’s mental information seems to take on
a more abstract, phonologically based feeling [48].
If large individual differences in both visual working memory
and mental imagery are common [3,29,47,49] and individuals
report using imagery-like strategies during visual working memory
tasks [13,45,46], and both involve activity in early visual cortex
[13,50], it follows that imagery may be an important cognitive
element in working memory tasks.
However, studies examining the role of visual imagery in visual
working memory tasks have produced mixed results [51]. Some
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have found no or negative relationships [51,55,56]. Despite this
work, the exact nature of the relationship between visual imagery
and working memory still remains unclear.
Here we capitalized on a new method to assess imagery, a visual
phenomenon called binocular rivalry. This phenomenon involves
presenting two different patterns, one to each eye, resulting in one
pattern reaching awareness while the other is suppressed. A study
by Pearson, Clifford & Tong (2008) found that when individuals
imagined one of two rivalry patterns, that pattern had a higher
probability of being dominant during a subsequent brief rivalry
presentation. In fact, longer periods of imagery led to stronger bias
effects, and these effects were highly specific to the orientation and
location of the imagined pattern. Interestingly, when imagery was
performed in the presence of a uniform illuminant background
these effects tended to be weaker as a function of the background
luminance [33,57]. A recent study by Pearson, Rademaker &
Tong (in press) has shown that subjective ratings of imagery
vividness on a trial-by-trial basis predict the subsequent perceptual
effect on binocular rivalry (but not on catch trials), while ratings of
effort do not. Likewise off-line questionnaire ratings of imagery
vividness tended to predict the strength of mental imagery as
measured with binocular rivalry. This finding is important for the
current work as it demonstrates that imagery as assessed using
binocular rivalry is both a measure of its low-level sensory
components and metacognitive sensations of vividness.
We utilized imagery’s bias effect on subsequent binocular rivalry
to investigate the role of imagery in different types of short-term
visual memory (i.e. visual working memory and iconic memory).
We show that individuals with strong imagery perform better in
visual working memory tasks than individuals with poor imagery.
However, imagery strength was unrelated to performance in iconic
memory. In addition, we capitalized on the known ability of
background luminance to interfere with imagery mechanisms to
show that good imagers, but not poor imagers, tend to use imagery
as a strategy for visual working memory tasks. This pattern only
held for visual working memory and not for working memory of
number strings, suggesting that luminance was attenuating
sensory-based imagery and not general working memory mech-
anisms. These results provide compelling new evidence that
imagery is a component of visual working memory for good
imagers, whereas poor imagers likely rely on a different strategy. A
dichotomy in cognitive strategies may help explain the diversity of
results in visual working memory studies.
Methods
Participants
Thirty five undergraduate students (twenty female, aged 18–35)
participated in the correlational study in exchange for course
credit. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision.
All thirty participants completed each measure of memory and
imagery for the first experiment. Seventeen undergraduate
students (ten female, aged 18–44) participated in the causal
luminance disruption experiments in exchange for course credit.
Informed written consent was obtained from all participants,
and all experiments were approved by the UNSW Human
Research Ethics Advisory Panel (Psychology).
Apparatus
All of the tasks were performed in darkened rooms with black
walls, to increase testing efficiency experiments were run on
two calibrated computer monitors, one 19 inch Phillip
Brilliance 109P4 monitor and a 21 inch Dell Trinitron monitor,
both with a resolution of 12806960 pixels, and a refresh rate of
75 Hz, one driven by a Mac Mini and the other an Imac
computer. Experiments were run in Matlab, using Psychophys-
ics toolbox [58,59]. A fixed viewing distance of 57 cm for all
experiments was obtained using a chinrest and participants
were instructed to maintain fixation on the bull’s-eye (a fixation
point) at all times throughout the experiment, which acted as a
fusion lock in the rivalry conditions. For the binocular rivalry
experiment a mirror stereoscope was attached to the chin rest.
The mirrors were carefully aligned for each individual
participant so that the patterns from each eye overlapped to
form visual rivalry.
Stimuli
In the imagery conditions the binocular rivalry stimuli consisted
of red horizontal (CIE x=.277, y=0.613) and green vertical (CIE
x=0.601, y=0.368) Gabor patterns, 1 cycle/u, Gaussian s=3.5u
(see figure 1A). The mean luminance of both Gabor patterns was
7.8 cdm
2 (candela per square metre). Both patterns were presented
in an annulus around a fixation spot. During the rapid serial visual
presentation task, lower case letters (Times New Roman, 0.6u in
height) were presented centrally. The background was black
throughout the entire task, unless otherwise stated. For all
luminance conditions the background ramped up to yellow (a
mix of the green and red colors used for the rivalry patterns, with
luminance at 7.8 cdm
2) during the imagery period. During this
period the background luminance was smoothly ramped up and
down to avoid visual transients (see figure 1A).
The stimuli in the visual working memory task (for the
correlational study) consisted of two Gabor patterns (1 cycle/u,
Gaussian s=6u), 70% contrast (see figure 1B). The Gabor
patterns were presented centrally and tilted clockwise at either 25u
or 115u. The background throughout the entire task in the
correlational study was grey with a luminance of 22 cdm
22. The
luminance experiments used green (CIE x=0.601, y=0.368) and
red (CIE x=.277, y=0.613) Gabor patterns, with all other pattern
parameters held constant. The background was black for the
duration of the experiment, with the exception of the retention
interval during the luminance condition.
In the iconic memory task, seven grey Gabor patterns (1 cycle/u,
Gaussian s=3u), 50% contrast, were used as the stimuli (see
figure 1C). The seven Gabor patches evenly surrounded the bull’s-
eye fixation spot in a circular fashion, at a 10u diameter, so that they
were somewhat in the participants’ peripheral vision. Each of the
seven Gabor patches had a unique orientation (between 0u to 360u)
which was randomly selected for each trial. The background
throughout the entire task was grey with a luminance of 22 cdm
22.
All numbers in the number-string working memory experiment
were white, presented on a black background (Times New Roman;
0.6u in height). During the retention interval the background was
black for the no luminance condition and white in the luminance
condition.
Procedure
Binocular Rivalry. To control for individual differences in
eye-dominance, which can lead to a perceptual bias for one eye,
participants underwent an eye dominance test prior to the imagery
task, as documented previously [33,57].
During the imagery conditions observers were instructed to
maintain fixation throughout each block of trials. For both the
correlational and luminance condition, a central cue (‘‘G’’ or ‘‘R’’)
was presented at the beginning of each trial to indicate whether
participants should form a mental image of a green vertical grating
or a red horizontal grating (see Figure 1A). This cue was
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Following the imagery period, participants underwent a distracter
task in which they indicated when a ‘‘C’’ or ‘‘V’’ was present in the
serial string of letters by pressing the corresponding keys (C or V)
on the keyboard. Each letter was displayed for 300 ms.
Participants then viewed the rivalry display for 750 ms and
reported on the dominant pattern. Rivalry dominance was
reported by pressing one of three assigned keys (1, 2 or 3) to
indicate: (1) green vertical, (3) red horizontal, or for an
approximately equal mixture of the two patterns (2) (due to
binocular combination or piecemeal rivalry). To minimize
potential response conflict, participants were required to use their
left hand to complete the distracter task and their right hand for
rivalry responses. Mixed mock rivalry trials were not used to
calculate the bias measure of imagery as in previous work [33]. In
the correlational study participants completed 40 binocular rivalry
trials. Participants in the luminance manipulation experiments
completed a total of 80 binocular rivalry trials, 40 with and 40
without a luminous background.
Iconic memory. Alpha-numeric figures are commonly used
to assess iconic memory [60]. To avoid possible confounds from
high-level cognitive information, the iconic memory task used
Gabor patterns, which are difficult to encode phonologically.
Hence, this should be a better measure of purely sensory visual
memory. Participants held fixation while seven Gabor patterns (see
figure 1C) were presented in the periphery in a circular fashion
surrounding the fixation point. Following an inter-stimulus interval
of 20 ms, 40 ms, or 400 ms a cue (line pointing to the previous
Gabor position) was then presented. The location of the cued
Gabor patch was randomized on each trial. A different Gabor
pattern subsequently appeared in the cued position. The
orientation of the Gabor patch was rotated either 20u clockwise
(for half of the trials) or anticlockwise (for half of the trials)
compared to the original Gabor pattern. Participants were asked
to indicate whether the Gabor patch had been rotated clockwise or
anticlockwise by pressing the right or left arrow key respectively. A
total of 84 trials were completed by each of the participants.
Visual working memory (VWM). The working memory
task used in this experiment was based on Harrison and Tong’s
(2009) working memory paradigm (see figure 1B). Participants
were presented with two Gabor patterns in a randomized
consecutive order. A cue was then presented - either the number
1 or 2- which prompted the participants to remember either the
first (cue number 1) or second (cue number 2) pattern. A retention
interval of six seconds followed. After this interval a test pattern
was presented rotated either +5u (for half of the trials) or -5u (for
half of the trials) as compared to the remembered pattern and
participants had to signal whether the test stimulus was rotated
clockwise or anticlockwise relative to the one held in memory, by
pressing the number 2 or 1 on the keypad respectively.
Participants in the correlational study completed 40 trials.
Participants in the luminance manipulation experiment
completed a total of 80 trials, 40 with and 40 without a
luminous background. It is worth noting that in this task test
stimuli of 30 and 120u the correct answer was always clockwise.
While for test stimuli of 20 and 110u the correct answer was always
counter-clockwise. Hence, such a task may not be ideal for studies
using larger number of total trials, as the test stimulus response
association may be learnt over time. As there were only a total of
10/20 trials for each of the test stimuli in the current study
(depending on the experiment), without any performance
feedback, in a randomized order, the likelihood that participants
were learning 4 specific orientations and their associated response
is very low. In addition, Performance on the visual working
memory task the individuals with strong mental imagery are
disrupted by a luminance change that only occurs during the
retention period, eg. during the test stimulus there is no luminance
change. Hence, for individuals with strong mental imagery,
performance on the visual working memory task has to be
contingent on a process during the retention period.
Number string working memory (NWM). The timing
here was identical to the visual working memory task (see
Figure 1B), however instead the Gabor pattern two strings of
five numbers were presented sequentially. A cue was then
presented, either the number 1 or 2, which prompted the
participants to remember either the first (cue number 1) or
second (cue number 2) number string. At the test phase
participants were shown a 5 digit number string and were then
Figure 1. Experimental timelines and stimuli. (A). During the imagery task participants were cued to imagine a red or green Gabor pattern for
10 sec. Next they performed a letter discrimination task, followed by the binocular rivalry display. Luminance profile shows the background
luminance dynamics during the imagery period in experiment 2. (B). For the visual working memory task participants were presented with two Gabor
patterns sequentially, and were then cued to remember only one. Following a retention period a test pattern was presented and participants were
required to indicate its orientation in relation to the pattern held in memory. (C). During the iconic memory task participants were presented with
seven Gabor patterns, and after the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) cued to remember only one of the seven. In the test phase a rotated Gabor pattern
was displayed in the cued location and participants had to indicate its orientation in relation to the pattern held in memory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029221.g001
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the number they were cued to remember by pressing the number 1
or 2 on the keypad, respectively. Participants in the luminance
manipulation experiment completed a total of 80 trials, 40 in the
luminance condition and 40 in the no luminance condition.
Results
Figure 2A shows a scatter plot for visual working memory and
mental imagery (as measured with binocular rivalry: see methods),
each dot represents an individual participant (N=35). There is a
significant positive correlation between visual working memory
and visual mental imagery, r(34)=.56, p,.001. That is,
participants whose imagery had a strong bias effect on perceptual
rivalry also tended to have more accurate visual working memory.
A letter discrimination task was added as part of the imagery
procedure, after the imagery period and before the rivalry
presentation. This task was included to prevent participants from
continuing to imagine during the actual rivalry presentation, as
concurrent imagery and perception could induce possible
confounds of visual attention [61]. In addition, this task can be
used to insure the pattern of data in the imagery task was not due
to complacency or lack of effort. There was no significant
relationship between the letter task performance and imagery
ability (r(34)=. 07, p=.76). These results, taken together with
previous studies using catch trials [33,34], suggest that poor scores
on the imagery task reflect a deficiency in imagery abilities and not
complacent participants.
The relationship between imagery and iconic memory was then
examined to assess whether imagery might be related to different
types of visual memory. To assess iconic memory we used a
circular array consisting of seven Gabor patterns (Figure 1C). In
the iconic memory literature there are often variations in the
different inter stimulus intervals used, likewise estimates of the
longevity of iconic memory range from 20 to 500 ms (Sperling,
1960; Coltheart, 1980; Graziano & Sigman). For this reasons we
used both short (20 ms and 40 ms) and long (400 ms) ISI
durations. Across the long and short ISIs there were no significant
correlations between iconic memory and mental imagery or
between iconic memory and working memory ability. The left
panels of Figures 2B, C and D show a non-significant correlation
for the same participants between mental imagery and the iconic
memory at 20, 40 and 400 ms (r(34)=.17, p=.34; r(34)=.13,
p=.46; r(34)=.08, p=.67, respectively). These r values were all
significantly different from the r value for visual working memory
and imagery strength (Williams, t-test between non-independent
Rs for: 20 ms t(31)=2.07, p,0.05; 40 ms t(31)=1.98, p,0.05;
400 ms t(31)=2.42, p,0.05). Here, individuals with strong
imagery tended to perform no better on the iconic memory task
than individuals with poor mental imagery.
In addition, the relationship between visual working memory
and iconic memory was examined to assess whether participants
who performed well on one measure of visual memory also
performed well on another. The right panels of figures 2B, C and
D show non-significant relationships between iconic memory at
20, 40 and 400 ms and visual working memory (r(34)=.23,
p=.19, r(34)=.04, p=.84, r(34)=.15, p=.41). All 3 r values were
significantly different from the r value for visual working memory
and imagery strength (Williams, t-test between non-independent
Rs, all Ps,.05). This indicates that participants’ performance on
visual working memory is not indicative of their performance on
iconic memory.
To further investigate the role of mental imagery in visual
working memory we manipulated the luminance of the back-
ground during both the working memory and imagery tasks (see
Figures 1A & B). Previous studies have demonstrated that greater
levels of background luminance lead to an attenuation of imagery
[33] and this is not due to dark adaptation [57]. It follows that if all
our participants were using imagery to solve the visual working
memory task, altering background luminance should attenuate the
imagery mechanism and hence also affect visual working memory
performance. However, if only some participants were adopting a
strategy that utilized imagery to solve the visual working memory
task, we might expect a decline in memory performance in only a
subset of participants. To assess whether luminance signals might
attenuate not only imagery processes but also general mechanisms
of working memory, we included a non-spatial ‘higher-level’
working memory task in which participants were required to
remember a number string instead of a visual pattern (see
methods).
Figure 3A displays the mean scores for all participants for both
the luminance and no luminance conditions. There is a weak trend
for luminance to attenuate imagery and visual working memory
performance. However, this effect did not reach significance for
either imagery or visual working memory (t(16)= 2.75, p=.47;
t(16)= 2.98, p=.34; respectively). Surprisingly the presence of
luminance tended to facilitate performance on the number-string
working memory task, with participants performing better in the
luminance condition (79%) than in the no luminance condition
(76%). However, this difference was also not significant,
t(16)=1.29, p=.22
We hypothesized that perhaps only a subset of participants
might be using a strategy that involved imagery. Perhaps
individuals with strong imagery were more likely to use mental
images to boost mnemonic performance. To test this we split the
data into two groups (a median split at ,60% in the imagery task)
based on each participant’s individual imagery score (the ‘good’
imagers group had significantly more perceptual bias in the no
luminance condition than the ‘poor’ imagers, t(15)=4.18,
p=0.001). This resulted in 10 individuals being placed in the
poor imagery group and 7 in the good imagery group.
Figure 3B shows the mean scores for the poor imagery group on
the left and the good imagery group on the right. Interestingly, on
average poor imagers performed slightly better in the presence of
luminance for all tasks. However this trend was not significant for
visual working memory (t(9)=.50), number-string (t(9)= 2.46,
p=.66), or imagery (t(9)=1.0).
The right side of figure 3B shows data from the good imagers
for the three conditions, with and without luminance. The
presence of luminance attenuated both visual working memory
and imagery performance, with participants performing signifi-
cantly better in the no luminance condition in comparison to the
luminance condition for both visual working memory and
imagery, t(6)= 23.79, p=.009, and t(6)= 24.77 p=.003,
respectively. For good imagers we found that performance in the
number-string task was slightly better in the luminance condition,
however this trend was not significant (t(6)=1.73 p=.13).
Discussion
Our study indicates a positive correlation between imagery and
visual working memory performance. No such relationships were
found between imagery and iconic memory, or iconic memory
and visual working memory. For individuals with strong mental
imagery, luminance attenuated performance in visual working
memory and imagery tasks, but did not affect memory for
number-strings. This suggests that those who have strong imagery
may utilise it to aid performance in visual working memory tasks.
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participant. The trend line shows a linear fit to the data. (B). There was no significant relationship between imagery strength and iconic memory
performance for the 20 ms iconic memory ISI (left panel). Likewise, there was no significant correlation between visual working memory and iconic
memory at 20 ms (right panel) (C). Similarly there was no significant relationship between imagery strength and iconic memory performance at an ISI
of 40 ms (left panel) or between iconic memory (40 ms) and visual working memory (right panel). (D). There were no significant correlations between
imagery strength (left panel) or visual working memory (right panel) for the iconic memory ISI of 400 ms. (For all correlations N=34). Assumptions of
normality, kurtosis, skewness and homoscadacity were met for all variables.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029221.g002
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asset in regards to solving visual working memory tasks, however
being a good imager does not seem to have any bearing on
performance on other forms of visual memory, such as iconic
memory.
Our results suggest that individuals might use different cognitive
strategies to solve the same visual memory task. More specifically
good imagers might use imagery to solve the memory task. Poor
imagers on the other hand do not, or are not able to create visual
images to a useful degree. However, individuals with poor imagery
still performed well in both working memory tasks. This suggests
that poor imagers likely rely on a non-imagery based strategy
perhaps a more ‘language like’ verbal workspace to complete the
task, using semantic propositional information from the mnemonic
stimuli, much like the strategy employed to store the number-
string information [48].
The current work also suggests that irrelevant visual stimuli can
interfere with the visio-spatial sketchpad, however this interference
might only occur when participants use imagery as a strategy in
solving visual working memory tasks. Current studies investigating
the effects of irrelevant visual stimuli on visual working memory
tasks have been working under the assumption that all people
process and manipulate visual stimuli in the same manner.
However, if, as our results suggest, only good imagers use visual
imagery to solve visual working memory tasks it might not come as
a surprise that some studies have found interfering effects from
visual distractors and others have not.
Despite the correlation between visual working memory and
mental imagery in experiment 1, participants with poor imagery
could still perform the visual working memory task (e.g. fig. 3B). In
other words, individuals with perhaps almost no functional mental
imagery could still perform well above chance in the visual
working memory task. This suggests that individuals were not
utilizing visual working memory skills to perform mental imagery,
but the other way around. If subjects were using visual working
memory mechanisms to perform imagery, we might expect the
degree of poor imagery to be limited by working memory
performance, however we demonstrate that imagery can almost be
functionally non-existent (according to our measure), while visual
working memory performance remains reasonable. Hence, we
propose that imagery might be an element in a compound working
memory system, such as the proposed visual spatial sketchpad
[21,62].
There is now strong evidence that early visual areas are
recruited and used during mental imagery tasks [33,63]. If early
visual areas are required to create detailed mental images [64]
and, as our results suggest, only good imagers use a mental
imagery strategy when solving visual working memory tasks, it is
possible that poor and good imagers recruit different neural
substrates when performing visual working memory tasks. If a
propositional or ‘language like’ strategy was employed, high-level
semantic and symbolic brain regions might be recruited as
opposed to early visual areas. Conversely, if an imagery strategy
were used, we would expect to see activation in early visual areas.
If there is such a dichotomy in strategies, our results may help
explain the current inconsistency in the literature in regards to the
neural correlates of visual working memory [9–13,65,66]. Some
previous studies have failed to take into account individual
differences in either imagery or working memory performance. If
individuals do use different cognitive strategies to solve visual
working memory tasks, which in turn use different neural
structures, this might explain why some studies have found
increased BOLD in early visual areas, while others have not. The
investigation of such individual differences may therefore provide
a valuable contribution to theoretical models of working memory.
The use of different cognitive strategies to complete visual
working memory tasks may also provide some insight into current
theories of working memory capacity. There are two primary
theories concerning the capacity and storage mechanisms of visual
working memory: the discrete resource model [7,67,68] and the
flexible resource model [5,69]. The discrete resource model
proposes that there is a limited number of ‘slots’ in memory that
can each be occupied with a single item, whereas the flexible
resource model posits that a finite memory resource can be spread
out over many sensory items at differing degrees of precision
[2,7,69]. Substantial evidence for and against both models exists.
However, neither theory is largely influenced by individual
differences in memory capacity, even though such individual
differences are well documented [2,3,49]. With individual
differences in visual working memory capacity ranging from 1
item to 7 items [2,7,49,66,70,71], it is somewhat surprising that
current models do not factor in potential causes behind such
Figure 3. Luminance manipulation experiments. Luminance attenuates working memory and imagery, but only for good imagers. (A). The
graph shows the mean performance for all participants in the luminance and no luminance conditions. There is no significant effect of luminance.
Error bars show 6 SEMs (N=17). (B). Data separated by imagery ability using a median split. The leftmost graph shows the data for poor imagers
(N=10), graph on the right for good imagers (N=7), error bars show 6 SEM. Good imagers show an effect of background luminance. It should be
noted that separating participants by imagery ability using a mean split resulted in the same patterns with no differences in performance for poor
imagers and attenuation effects for good imagers when in the luminance condition for visual working memory and luminance respectively,
t(5)= 26.19, p=.002, and t(5)= 24.21 p=.008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029221.g003
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accuracy in visual working memory tasks, it may similarly have a
modulatory effect on capacity limits. If this is the case, one may
expect to find large individual differences in capacity limits that
parallel the documented individual differences in imagery
strength.
Behavioural work has shown that imagery can alter sensory
perception [33,57,72,73]. If imagery is in fact utilized during visual
working memory then one might expect the contents of visual
working memory to likewise alter sensory perception. This is
exactly what has recently been found [15]. Here the authors report
that the content of visual working memory directly changed
perception of a separate visual stimulus.
It will be interesting for future studies to assess the impact of
individual differences and even to incorporate the known
characteristics of imagery into theoretical models of visual working
memory. Our results suggest that individuals with strong imagery
will utilize it during visual working memory tasks and that this may
give them a competitive edge, allowing for greater mnemonic
accuracy. Future work should shed light on the physiological basis
of stronger and more vivid imagery, while unlocking the intricate
relationship between imagery and many cognitive and sensory
functions.
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